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EARTH DAM FAILURE BY EROSION, A CASE HISTORY
Scott Newhouse
Senior Engineer
Bechtel Power Corporation
5275 Westview Drive
Frederick, MD 21703 (USA)
e-mail: sgnewhou@bechtel.com; tel: 301-228-7144; fax: 301-682-6415

ABSTRACT
In January 1998, the Archusa Creek Dam in southeast Mississippi failed by breaching through its emergency spillway. At the time of
its failure, the dam had a concrete ogee weir for a principal spillway and a vegetated earth emergency spillway. Fortunately, the dam is
a low hazard structure, as there is little development downstream, and consequences of failure were mostly limited to the loss of a
state-owned, recreational water park. The dam failed as a result of a 5-year storm event, triggered by intense rainfall of nearly 4.25 in.
in just a few hours. Runoff generated by the storm caused a rapid rise in lake level to elevation above the flood pool, resulting in flow
over the emergency spillway. A breach then formed through the emergency spillway due to progressive erosion and head-cutting
caused by excessive water flow velocity, a well-known failure mechanism. This paper examines how the failure happened, including
the aspects leading up to the breach. Hydrologic, hydraulic, and geotechnical aspects of the failure are discussed, including the dam’s
design and subsequent modifications, its problems leading to failure, the engineering solution used to repair the dam, and how this
solution solves the problems that led to failure in the first place.

INTRODUCTION

Dam Details

Archusa Creek Dam was built in 1971. Figure 1 illustrates the
location of the dam near Quitman, Mississippi. A state agency
owns the lake and dam; it is used exclusively for recreation
(operation of a water park). The lake is shallow, with typical
depth of about 1.2 m (4 ft), and generally ranging from 1.2 to
2.4 m (4 to 8 ft).

The dam is built of compacted earth fill with a maximum
height of 7.6 m (25 ft) and a length of about 1370 m (4,500 ft).
The dam is homogenous, with no internal seepage control and
no foundation cut-off. Fill material for the dam is generally
fine silty sand as this soil was locally available for
construction.

The lake is about 172 ha (425 ac). The size of the lake’s
watershed is about 15,800 ha (39,000 ac), resulting in
significant in-flow to the lake during storm events. There is
little storage volume available in the lake compared to in-flow;
consequently, the dam must pass nearly all in-flow.

In the 1980s, the principal spillway was fitted with an
inflatable gate; this configuration was modified in 1994 due to
ongoing problems with maintenance and vandalism. In 1994,
the spillway was modified with an ogee crest and series of
sluice gates through the ogee. The crest and the gate inlets
were all fitted with fish-retaining screens. Figure 2 illustrates
these spillway modifications. Notably, the fish-retaining
screens clogged with debris during the failure storm and
contributed to breaching by restricting spillway capacity.

The lake is in the flood-plain of the Chickasawhay River. A
high river stage produces tail-water below the dam that often
exceeds the lake elevation.
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Fig. 1. Location map (source map USGS Quitman, Miss. Quadrangle, 1983).
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relative scale).
Grates placed on spillway crest
and over sluice gate openings

Flood debris left
in spillway

Archusa Creek Dam,
Clark County, Mississippi
Principal spillway
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Fig. 2. Photo showing spillway modifications.
For passing in-flow exceeding the principal spillway capacity,
the dam was designed with an uncontrolled emergency
spillway, with a vegetated earth surface/lining. During the
1994 modification, the emergency spillway was widened from
120 m (400 ft) to 300 m (1,000 ft). This modification was
effected by excavating the embankment down to spillway
elevation over this portion of the dam. It was again modified
shortly before the 1998 failure with the excavation of a
drainage ditch within the spillway to facilitate rapid drainage
of flood water from lake-side residential yards. Residents of
several lake-side houses built within the flood pool had
complained of water in their yards after storms that raised the
lake to or near its flood-pool. The ditch excavation in the
emergency spillway was undertaken to appease these
complaints. This later modification contributed to the dam
breach by initiating erosion in the emergency spillway.
Figures 1 and 3 illustrate the position of the emergency
spillway on the dam. It is located near the middle of the dam
at the maximum section as opposed to one of the abutments.
Consequently, the soils below the emergency spillway were
primarily fill, not native in-situ soil. The soil forming the
emergency spillway was fine silty sand placed as fill. When
the emergency spillway was widened, the excavation was
extended into the sand fill placed to build the dam.

Fig. 3. Breach through emergency spillway.
Archusa Creek Dam,
Clark County, Mississippi

Fig. 4. Close-up view of breach.

DETAILS OF DAM BREACH FAILURE
The breach was formed by the erosion of soil within the
vegetated earth emergency spillway due to the high discharge
velocity, which the spillway surface could not sustain. Figures
3 and 4 illustrate the position of the breach within the dam.
The storm causing the failure was an event corresponding to a
5-year return period. Rainfall from this storm was nearly 16.5
cm (6.5 in.) in a 3-day period. However, the dam’s failure was
preceded by intense rainfall of 10.8 cm (4.25 in.) over a period
of only a few hours. Figure 5 illustrates the grass lining on the
emergency spillway, and shows the fine sand soil within the
spillway. Figure 6 illustrates the lake’s shallow depth (note
Paper No. 3.18a

Fig. 5. Photo showing grass surface on spillway.
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velocity (atypical) is about 2.4 m/s (8 ft/s) for a non-erodible
soil and specific Bermuda species of grass.

Fig. 6. Photo illustrating principal spillway and typical depth
of lake.

Emergency Spillway Operation
Analysis shows that the emergency spillway would activate
with a storm corresponding to a 2-year return period.
Consequently, the emergency spillway was subjected to
frequent flow. Hydraulic analysis indicates that flow in the
emergency spillway in the 1998 failure storm was 200 m3/s
(7,000 cu ft/s), with a velocity exceeding 1.5 m/s (5 ft/s).

Erosion Mechanism
NRCS and USACE design references establish a range of
velocity that a vegetated earth spillway can sustain. The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) (2003)
tabulates sustainable velocity listed in applicable NRCS and
USACE design guide documents, as excerpted below, in Fig.
7. The NRCS document establishes a typical sustainable
velocity in the range of 0.6 to 1.5 m/s (2 to 5 ft/s), depending
on the base soil and the grass type. Maximum sustainable

The type of fine silty sand soil used as fill in the emergency
spillway has a low resistance to erosion. According to the
criteria in Fig. 7, maximum sustainable velocity on the
Archusa Creek Dam’s emergency spillway is 0.8 m/s (2.5
ft/s). Based on the calculated velocity during the 1998 failure
storm near 1.5 m/s (5 ft/s), erosion through the spillway
material would have been expected. The calculated velocity is
based on the broad, flat spillway; the ditch excavated into the
emergency spillway would have resulted in velocity exceeding
1.5 m/s (5 ft/s).
The specific erosion mechanism is illustrated and explained by
Seed et al. (2006). This group extensively studied the soil
erosion process in levee over-topping after the Hurricane
Katrina disaster in New Orleans. The work by Seed et al. is
not specifically applicable to vegetated earth spillways, but the
erosion principle for soils is the same in the levee study and in
the case of the dam spillway. Results of the New Orleans
levee study match the specific events of the dam spillway: the
erosion of a fine sand soil. The levee study parameters for
velocity and critical shear stress apply to a bare soil without
vegetation. For the dam spillway, once the vegetation was lost
during the breach event, the resulting bare soil was then
similar to the study condition.
Figure 8 illustrates that the fine silty sand soil within the
dam’s emergency spillway is generally the most easily eroded
soil category and that erosion will result in this soil at a shear
stress of about 0.1 N/m2, the minimum for all soil types.

Fig. 8. Quantified measure of erodibility—critical shear stress
versus mean soil grain size (Seed et al. 2006).
Fig. 7. Range of sustainable velocity on vegetated earth
surface (FERC 2003).
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Figure 9 shows that for shear stress above the threshold value
for fine sand, 0.1 N/m2, a significant scour rate results. For the
water velocity imparted to the spillway during the failure
storm, exceeding 1.0 m/s, Fig. 8 indicates that the fine sand in
the spillway would erode at a rate exceeding 1,000 mm/hr.
These values apply to a bare soil not protected by vegetation.
Accordingly, the values do not establish specific parameters
4

Fig. 9. Erodibility function for a sand (Seed et. al. 2006).
for velocity and erosion rates applicable to the dam spillway.
However, Fig. 8 does provide aquantifiable indication that
erosion would take place within the dam spillway during the
breach storm event.

2.

The downward and downstream erosion associated
with the concentrated flow that leads to formation of
a vertical or near-vertical head-cut in the vicinity of
initial failure.

With the expected scour rate over 1,000 mm/hr and velocity
imparted to the spillway exceeding 1 m/s, Fig. 10 illustrates
that the spillway would have been highly erodible and prone
to failure by overtopping. The levee study results depicted in
Figs. 8 through 10, combined with the sustainable velocity
range portrayed in Fig. 7, explain why erosion resulted in the
spillway during the breach storm event.

3.

The upstream advance and deepening of the head-cut
resulting from flow over the vertical or near-vertical
face.

Figure 11 illustrates the three-phase mechanism described
above for over-topping failure in earth dams. Failure is
initiated by erosion of the soil particles due to excess velocity.
A near-vertical face is formed, which travels progressively
toward the reservoir during the erosion process (head-cutting).
Finally the head-cutting process effects complete breach of the
dam.
Overtopping is essentially the same erosion process that takes
place in a vegetated earth spillway. This is especially true for
the Archusa Creek Dam, as addressed in the DISCUSSION
section of this paper.

DISCUSSION

Consequences of Failure

Fig. 10. Proposed guidelines for levee overtopping (Seed et al.
2006)
NRCS (1997) defines the specific process of erosion in earth
dam spillways using a three-phase process:
1.

The failure of the vegetal cover protection (if any)
and the development of concentrated flow.
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The dam was not a high hazard structure; consequences of
failure had little effect on downstream property or
infrastructure. As Fig. 2 illustrates, the Chickasawhay River is
just downstream, close to the spillway discharge channel.
Downstream development is sparse due to the river’s
floodplain. At the time of the dam breach, local media
reported a “wall of water” released from the dam. In fact,
during the storm event, river stage rose above the lake
elevation. Shortly after the dam breach, rising tail-water
flowed into the reservoir from the river. Obviously there was
no wall of water produced by the breach.
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Fig. 11. Illustration of dam breach by overtopping- embankment breach test of a homogeneous non-plastic sandy soil conducted at the
ARS Hydraulic Laboratory, Stillwater, OK (FEMA 2001).

The real consequences of failure were economic ones. The
water park was a prominent part of the local economy; the
small community was dependent on it, and local merchants
suffered when it was closed. The cost of repair to the dam was
the most significant consequence, an estimated cost of $1.3
million.

impractical, training dikes can be used to keep flow
off of the dam toe, but this configuration is not
preferable.
•

Alignment and grade—The spillway control section
is designed to reduce velocity over the spillway to a
sustainable level. Alignment and slope on the
spillway are set so that velocity stays within the
sustainable range for the length of the spillway.

Earth Spillway Design
Established design methods call for earth spillways to be
located at abutments and founded in cut to prevent the erosion
of fill soil. The NRCS has extensive guidance for location,
alignment, and grade for an emergency spillway (summarized
below) so that erosion will not cause a breach failure. Figure
12 illustrates design guidance for these criteria.
•

Location—The most important element of location is
to place the spillway where erosion and breach does
not result in dam failure. As discussed above, this
criterion is met by locating the spillway at an
abutment, cut into native soil (alternatively the
spillway can be cut through a saddle in terrain on the
lake perimeter). Preferred location for the spillway is
where it can discharge downstream without flow onto
the toe of the dam. For sites where this alignment is
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The earthen emergency spillway design for the Archusa Creek
Dam did not conform to these criteria. The spillway was
located in the middle of the dam, with its bottom in fill where
it should have been at an abutment in cut. The spillway did not
have a control section sufficient to lower velocity to a
sustainable level. Further, the drainage ditch excavated into
the spillway concentrated flow and increased velocity,
initiating erosion during the failure storm.

With the emergency spillway out of conformance with these
guidelines, erosion was a threat to dam safety. The choice of
grass for the emergency spillway lining was inappropriate.
Some armored lining, e.g., rip-rap, would be required for the
emergency spillway geometry in order to prevent erosion that
could result in dam breach.

6

over it, roughly 0.8 m/s (2.5 ft/s). The 1998 storm
produced flow with velocity much greater than this
limit.
•

Lack of control section—There was no means to
control velocity at the spillway entrance. With no
control section, the excavation of the ditch into the
emergency spillway set up a flow velocity that would
exceed the speed limit discussed above.

•

Unsuitable lining—Grass over erodible soil would
not sustain the discharge velocity and frequency.

Setting the Stage for Failure—A
Emergency Spillway
Fig. 12. Diagram illustrating proper emergency spillway
layout (From NRCS (1997)).

Hydraulic Design
NRCS design guides and most state regulations require that
reservoir storage and principal spillway capacity allow for
flow over an emergency spillway at a storm return period of
100 years. The 1998 configuration of the Archusa Creek Dam
emergency spillway resulted in flow on an almost 2-year
frequency.

CONCLUSIONS AND PROMINENT LESSONS
For the 1998 dam configuration, the earth emergency spillway
had an activation frequency of every 2 years, where this
frequency by current design standards should have been closer
to 100 years. Consequently, the emergency spillway was used
frequently, not on an emergency basis. For this frequency of
use, the spillway should have been an armored auxiliary one.
The dam breach was actually an over-topping failure. Because
the earth emergency spillway was located in the interior of the
dam (versus at an abutment), and built on fill (versus in cut),
water flowing over this surface was essentially the same as
flowing over the dam.
This case shows the merit of the NRCS design guidance for
earth emergency spillways. The features of the Archusa Creek
Dam’s emergency spillway that did not conform to the NRCS
design guide were the major factors leading to failure:
•

•

Location on the dam— The spillway was located
near the center of the dam, in a position where
erosion led to breach through the dam. It was not
positioned at the abutment cut into native soil.
Spillway surface—The surface was in fill versus cut
into native soil. The use of erodible fill soil in the
spillway established the speed limit for water flowing
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Speed Limit on the

Modifications to the dam set the stage for failure. The socalled widening of the emergency spillway was essentially
lowering the top of the dam, thus reducing freeboard.
Excavating into the dam at the position of the emergency
spillway near the middle of the dam involved excavating
embankment fill material. This operation essentially lowered
the top of the dam. With reduced freeboard and a design that
entailed the storm pool to reach the emergency spillway on a
2-year frequency, the stage was set for failure by over-topping.
The modification to the principal spillway added another
element for potential failure. Changes in the principal spillway
included the addition of an ogee weir with manual sluice
gates. The gates and the weir crest were all fitted with fishretaining grates, as illustrated in Fig. 2. As Fig. 2 illustrates,
the grates collected significant debris during the storm event,
consequently restricting flow capacity through and over the
spillway. The reduced capacity from the clogged grates was
probably never envisioned or accounted for in the dam
modification. While the disadvantage of grates over the
spillway openings is evident, there is little known benefit.
The final modification, excavation of a ditch into the
emergency spillway, was the factor that put the failure
mechanism into motion. After this modification, the only
required ingredient was a storm of sufficient size to raise the
lake above flood-pool and send water over the emergency
spillway with sufficient velocity. The modifications to the dam
had established a speed limit for water over the vegetated
emergency spillway. Unfortunately, nature would not abide by
this speed limit and supplied a flow of water exceeding it.
Flow on the spillway exceeding the speed limit initiated the
failure by starting the erosion process that steadily progressed
to a breach.

Repair
Several alternatives were considered for repair of the dam and
its return to service. Immediately after the dam failure, local
government proposed $500,000 in funding to re-fill the breach
and return the dam to service. However, it was pointed out that
7

this investment would only put the dam back into the same
deficient condition that it was in when it failed.
A concrete labyrinth weir spillway was selected as the main
repair component; it was built within the gully made by the
breach. This new concrete spillway, now used as an auxiliary
spillway, has helped designers solve the problem of flow over
an earthen emergency spillway at a 2-year frequency and
should prevent such a disaster in the future.
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